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• This work was sponsored in part by:
– the Community Intelligence Office and





– High Assurance Systems
• Hybrid Security Architectures




• Dual of Confidentiality
– Labels indicate potential loss from
• unauthorized modification
• vs. unauthorized disclosure
• Translation from Confidentiality
– inverted/convoluted
– difficult concepts [Gasser]
• Analysis can be overlooked
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Integrity (2)
• Inherent Integrity and Confidentiality
– explicit labels
– or implicitly understood
• Unclear distinctions/assumptions
– High confidentiality implies high integrity?
• Integrity of Code
– fidelity to original  - e.g., distributed version
– fidelity to described intent
• correct functionality
– no additional functionality
• trap doors, Trojan horses
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High Assurance Systems
• Enforce confidentiality and integrity
– to defined degree of assurance



















Need to Generalize Remote Access
• remote programs
• remote data















– COTS in Government RFPs















• Balanced Assurance + COTS + MLS
• Configuration Components
• Untrusted COTS terminals/workstations
• Untrusted COTS applications
• Storage devices
– Multilevel data
• Multilevel TCB mechanisms (RVM)
• TCB extensions
• Network Connections























































• Reference Validation Mechanism
– mediates access to objects
– controls object creation, storage, access, I/O
– prevents data leakage across MAC
partitions
• confidentiality write-down or read-up
• integrity read-down or write-up (if enforced)





• System trusted for confidentiality
– to confidentiality capacity of reference
validation module
• capacity is relative to RVM assurance
• Yellow Book
– Maps assurance levels to confidentiality ranges





–  dual of confidentiality
• “prevents data contamination from untrusted
software”
– was the modification correct?
• Within the partition
• Code trusted to handle data correctly
– to its level of assurance
• No Yellow Book for integrity
• Look to code integrity label
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Code Module Integrity Label
• What the system designer needs it to be
– Coherent network architecture
• least privilege
– Limit: pedigree of code
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Trust in Commercial Applications
• Evaluation below B2/EAL5
– little config. mgt. or code review required
• no examination for Trojan horses/trap doors
• no code correspondence
– no trusted distribution
– potential for unknown functionality
• e.g., “Easter eggs” common in commercial
software
• testing doesn’t address unknowns





• Some Code Modules can modify user
data
– set of Data Modifying Modules = DMM
• System integrity capacity:
– integrity of least-trusted Module
• I_capacity = GLB(m Œ DMM) (integrity(m))
– (system confidentiality capacity is:
• capacity of reference validation module)
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Integrity Capacity: two cases
– Integrity not supported
• system can take in data higher in integrity than
system
• data output is lowered to integrity GLB of DMM
– de facto label
– Integrity Supported by RVM
• system regulates its own integrity capacity
– " m Œ DMM, o: object (
» write (m,o) Æ dominates(integrity(m), integrity(o))
– cannot take in data higher than integrity GLB of DMM
– assumes modules/subjects are labeled correctly




• HSA applications and user interfaces
– COTS
– below B2/EAL5 (integrity untrusted or low
assurance)
– generally designed to modify data
• HSA systems have untrusted or low
assurance integrity capacity
• Hybrid Security Architecture systems not
suitable for environments with




• Correct integrity labeling of code is
critical
• Code-module integrity limits system
integrity capacity
– Not new information
– Not always remembered
– Not always communicated to sponsors and
customers
• HSA systems not suitable in










– Subject consists of a set of code modules
– " m: module, s: subject o: object(
 write(s,o) & m Œ s
 Æ integrity (m) ≥ integrity(s) ≥ integrity(o))
 ≥ - enforced by design/configuration
 ≥ - enforced by RVM
 Need both for coherent integrity enforcement
– (Dominates “≥” )
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